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 The Evolution of International Norms
 ANN FLORINI
 This article puts forward a theoretical explanation for why norms of
 international behavior change over time. It argues that the mainstream
 neorealist and neoliberal arguments on the static nature of state interests
 are implausible, as the recent empirical work of the growing constructivist
 school has convincingly shown. But the constructivists have not yet pro-
 vided a theoretical basis for understanding why one norm rather than
 another becomes institutionalized, nor has learning theory yet provided
 an adequate explanation. An evolutionary approach that draws its hy-
 potheses from an analogy to population genetics offers a promising
 alternative. This article briefly outlines the constructivist critique of neo-
 realism and neoliberalism. It develops the evolutionary analogy, illustrating
 the model with a case study on the emergence of a norm of transparency
 in international security and briefly discussing how the model might apply
 in several other issue areas.
 The more than three centuries of the nation-state system have witnessed repeated
 sweeping changes in the broadly accepted standards of international behavior.
 Slavery, common for millennia, has virtually disappeared. Colonialism has given
 way to agreement on the right of self-determination. Aggression across recognized
 national borders, once a standard tool of state policy, now meets with international
 condemnation. To date, although the literature on norms is immense, the major
 traditions of international relations theory-neoliberalism and neorealism-have
 not adequately addressed these transformations of frundamental norms of interstate
 behavior. Instead, these theories assume that at most norms are unexplained
 sources of the exogenously given preferences of actors. Of late, the materialist
 assumptions of these theories have come under intense challenge from the rapidly
 growing constructivist literature, which draws on a diverse array of theoretical
 literature and empirical studies to argue that norms have explanatory power
 independent of structural and situational constraints (Finnemore, 1994, 1996;
 Tannenwald, 1995; Katzenstein, 1996).
 But the constructivists, for all their compelling empirical case studies, have yet to
 develop a theory of norm change. Why, of the variety of norms available at any given
 time to govern behavior in particular choice situations, does one rather than another
 become a widely accepted standard of behavior? This article explores this question,
 making norms the dependent rather than the independent variable. Is the predomi-
 nance of specific norms based merely on historically conjunctural idiosyncracies, or
 are there definite patterns that allow us to explain the changing role of any
 particular norm?
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 364 The Evolution of International Norms
 The evolutionary argument developed in this article draws an analogy between
 genes and norms to provide new insights into the development of norms. In short,
 it argues that norms, like genes, are instructional units. These units influence the
 behavior of their host organisms. And norms, like genes, are "contested"-that is,
 they are in competition with other norms or genes that carry incompatible instruc-
 tions-and some are reproduced at much higher rates than their competitors.
 This article constructs an evolutionary theory of the conditions under which a
 contested norm will spread or decline. It begins by defining what norms are and
 reviewing the debate over whether they matter. It then sets out the evolutionary
 hypotheses, contrasting them with the implicitly evolutionary basis of neorealism.
 The article argues that three simultaneous conditions must be met for a new mutant
 norm to replace an existing one. It illustrates the arguments with a description of
 several cases of norm evolution, focusing on the evolution of the norm of transpar-
 ency in international security. Because the article is concerned only with explaining
 the rise and fall of individual norms, it does not consider broad historical patterns
 of normative change, nor does it make more than passing reference to the vast
 framework of existing norms embodied in international law.
 What Are Norms?
 Janice Thomson (1993:81) contends that the most useful definition of an interna-
 tional norm is "only that 'as a rule' states engage in such practices," a definition that
 encompasses all observed patterns of behavior. Axelrod (1986) similarly defines
 norms as standard behaviors, although he adds the qualifier that actors are often
 punished when seen to be violating the norm. But used in this way, the term provides
 no particular analytical focus. It would include all behavior that is clearly driven by
 short-term material incentives. It thus conflates behavior that is determined by
 simple power relationships with that which is normatively driven. The whole point
 of the norms literature is to investigate what has too often been left out of theories
 of international relations-how it is that states determine their interests, and the
 role of social construction in shaping behavior. It is the sense of "oughtness" that is
 analytically distinct, and it is to refer to that sense of obligation that we need a term.
 The appropriate term for this purpose is "norm."
 By defining "norms" as standards of behavior and notjust behavioral regularities,
 we stress two important points. First, norms are about behavior, not directly about
 ideas. This accords with the best-known definition of norms in the international
 relations theory literature, found in the regimes literature (Krasner, 1983) which
 considers norms to be one component of regimes. Regimes are "principles, norms,
 rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge
 in a given issue-area" that serve to "constrain immediate, short-term power maxi-
 mization" (Krasner, 1983:1, 3). The norms that help to constitute regimes consist
 of "standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations" (Krasner,
 1983:3). However, there is no reason to restrict a norm to the confines of a given
 issue area, as regime theory does. A better definition describes norms as "a set of
 intersubjective understandings readily apparent to actors that makes behavioral
 claims on those actors" (Finnemore, 1994:2, fn. 2). Because they are intersubjective,
 or shared, they are not merely individual idiosyncracies. Instead, they "leave broad
 patterns of the sort that social science strives to explain" (Finnemore, 1994:3). These
 patterns matter to international relations theorists because, once embedded in social
 institutions, they act like structures, shaping states' behavior (Thomson, 1993:72).
 Second, this definition underlines the point that the essence of the distinctiveness
 of a norm is the sense of "ought." This sense of ought, of how an actor should behave,
 can apply either to the individual actor or to others who witness and assess the actor's
 behavior. The most important characteristic of a norm is that it is considered a
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 legitimate behavioral claim. No matter how a norm arises, it must take on an aura of
 legitimacy before it can be considered a norm. Norms are obeyed not because they
 are enforced, but because they are seen as legitimate.
 Do Norms Matter?
 The debate over whether such fuzzy and imprecise things as "norms" and "ideas"
 affect the behavior of states independent of structure and material factors is an old
 and recurrent one. The currently dominant schools of international relations theory
 have little room for norms. Game theory, which addresses the form rather than the
 content of strategic interaction, sees norms as exogenously determined coordinat-
 ing mechanisms that enable actors to select among multiple equilibria or to
 overcome collective action problems (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Schelling, [1960]
 1980; Stein, 1990, 1993; Binmore, 1994). But this is a functionalist argument
 without a mechanism to explain the functioning. Norms arise because they are
 "needed" to bring about cooperation in a mixed-motive setting or a game with
 multiple equilibria. This begs the question of what mechanism exists that causes this
 need to be met, providing no way to understand why norms do not always arise to
 solve all collaboration problems, or why actors settle on one equilibrium rather than
 another, or why the actors change the equilibrium selected. I
 Neorealism and neoliberalism, the main theories about the content of interna-
 tional relations, see norms as standards of behavior that can alter the calculations
 of costs and benefits and constrain the options available to policy makers, but again
 norms are exogenized. In neorealism, which focuses on security issues, norms reflect
 the distribution of power among states and have an only limited influence as
 intervening variables between power distribution and international outcomes. Be-
 cause this distribution of power is the chief, if not the only, important determinant
 of actor behavior, change in international relations, including norm change, comes
 about when this distribution of power changes. In contrast, neoliberals, who have
 worked primarily on economic interactions and have a relatively optimistic view of
 the likelihood of sustained international cooperation, tend to accord those inter-
 vening variables a more enduring and significant influence than do the neorealists.
 Yet in both approaches norms are dismissed as being determined by factors
 exogenous to the theory.
 All of these approaches ignore a crucial feature of international relations: what
 it is that states are trying to accomplish.2 The vague assumptions of neorealism and
 neoliberalism, that states are trying to maximize either relative power or absolute
 wealth, are too general to provide much of a guide to states, even if they are accurate
 assumptions. Ruggie (1983:198) points out that prevailing power-oriented concep-
 tions of international authority either take interests, which he calls "social purpose,"
 for granted, or seek to deduce them from state power. "The problem with this
 formulation," as he notes, "is that power may predict theform of the international
 order, but not its content."
 I Ullmann-Margalit (1977) is among those who assert that norms arise as solutions to problems posed by certain
 game situations. In passing, she notes that her approach implicitly assumes an evolutionary, "natural selection" process
 to explain why these solutions occur and persist, but she leaves the analogy unexplored.
 2 Keohane (1993: 285), who prefers to refer to neoliberalism as "institutionalism," has recently written:
 In the absence of a specification of interests (which will depend in part on domestic politics), institution-
 alist predictions about cooperation are indeterminate.
 That is, institutional theory takes states' conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained
 within the terms of the theory. Unlike naive versions of commercial or republican liberalism, institu-
 tionalist theory does not infer a utility function for states simply from their material economic interests
 or the alleged values common to democracy.... Nor does realism predict interest. This weakness of
 systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their relative predictive power.
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 To rectify this significant omission, other scholars (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam,
 1993; Rosecrance and Stein, 1993) examine the domestic sources of state prefer-
 ences and interests. They point out that neorealism's tendency to "black-box" states
 into undifferentiated units responsive only to systemic stimuli omits most of the
 significant sources of change in international relations. This is an important advance
 in understanding where states' preferences and policies come from. But the empha-
 sis on domestic sources of state behavior does not explain the type of policy
 convergence among a large number of highly varied states that occurs with norm
 changes. Similarly, foreign policy analysis and comparative politics usually concen-
 trate on cases involving a single country or, at most, a very small number of states
 (Finnemore, 1996:ch. 1). These nonsystemic approaches do not lend themselves
 readily to analysis of policy convergence among large numbers of states, inherently
 a systemic phenomenon.
 In response to these shortcomings, a growing "constructivist" branch of the theory
 literature has drawn on sociological concepts to seek insights into the formation of
 and sources of change of national interests and the perceived meaning of behavior
 (Wendt, 1987; Katzenstein, 1996).3 The constructivist theorists see norms as crucial.
 In this view, what states aim to do is an endogenous variable, not an exogenous
 given, and norms shape both the goals of states-their perceptions of their inter-
 ests-and the means they use to achieve those goals. While rational choice sees
 norms as reflections of the fixed preferences of the most powerful states, the
 constructivist approach believes that one of the roles norms play is to help determine
 those preferences. Because the ability of states to make correct choices of strategy
 is constrained both by limited rationality and by great uncertainty, the behavioral
 guidance provided by norms is crucial as a cognitive energy-saver and as a clue to
 successful strategies. The realm of conceivable behavior in a given social structure is
 normatively determined and it is not as wide as the realm of behavior that is
 physically possible. At the same time, which behaviors are conceivable, that is, which
 norms are accepted, varies over time.
 The burgeoning constructivist literature is providing impressive empirical evi-
 dence that norms do alter the behavior of states in ways not explainable solely by
 short-term power maximization. Schelling (1994) and Tannenwald (1995) have
 independently shown that a norm prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has
 significantly constrained at least U.S. policy makers. Nadelmann (1990) has argued
 that norms about the slave trade, colonialism, and a wide range of economic,
 military, and environmental matters have varied substantially over time, in ways that
 do not seem to reflect the prevailing distribution of power. These studies make it
 clear that something more is at work than the mere exercise of material power.
 While there is no shortage of behavior driven by short-term interests, states
 conceptualize those interests in the context of prevailing international norms, and
 the instruments used to pursue those interests are chosen within a normative
 framework.
 Such is the state of the art on the debate over norms. Mainstream theory does
 not address the issues of preference formation and communication where norms
 play their most significant roles and does not address how norms spread or why one
 norm rather than another may be chosen. It is assumed that states knowwhat they want,
 and their interests and preferences are postulated. Other theorists who look into the
 domestic sources of state behavior investigate rather than postulate preferences, but
 3 A number of terms have been used to refer to the literature that applies sociological concepts to international
 relations theory. "Reflectivist" enjoyed a surge of popularity following its coinage by Robert Keohane (1988).Of late,
 most of the scholars in this field have adopted the term "constructivist," referring to the concept that actors in
 international relations, such as states, are socially constructed entities whose characteristics can be analyzed as variables,
 in contrast to the rational choice theories that treat those characteristics as exogenous givens.
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 they still assume that states know what they want. The constructivists, on the other
 hand, argue that interests and preferences emerge from social construction and that
 states must learn what they want. This approach is both closer to reality and more
 useful in investigating the roles of norms, which often teach states what they want,
 but it is very hard to tease a theory out of the rich descriptions in the constructivist
 literature that can explain norms as dependent variables. A new and different
 approach is needed to provide insight into the processes by which norms rise,
 spread, and decline over time.
 The Evolutionary Model
 This study starts from the constructivist perspective that norms and ideas do matter
 and that the norms that are accepted do not merely reflect the interests of the
 materially powerful. But if power is not the explanation for norm change, what is?
 Why do norms wax and wane over time? Given that many norms are contested-that
 is, that there are two or more norms competing to set the standard of behavior in
 a given area-what determines which one prevails?
 The evolutionary argument made here draws an analogy between genes and
 norms. The analogy works on three levels. First, genes and norms have similar
 functions as the instructional units directing the behavior of their respective organ-
 isms. It is well known that genes strongly condition the behavior of most individual
 animals, if not humans.4 In international relations, norms govern much state
 behavior.
 Second, genes and norms are both transmitted from one individual to another
 through similar processes of inheritance. This neo-Darwinian perspective looks at
 norms as part of the set of beliefs, attitudes, and values that are culturally transmit-
 ted. This cultural transmission is a type of inheritance, an inheritance of items of
 information passed from one mind or social organism to another, just as genes are
 units of genetic information passed through reproduction from one biological
 organism to another.
 Third, norms, like genes, are "contested"-that is, they are in competition with
 other norms that carry incompatible instructions. Because contested norms must
 compete for time and attention, just as genes compete for slots on chromosomes,
 both are subject to the forces of natural selection, and their prevalence in a
 population waxes and wanes over time. These changes in the relative frequencies
 of genes or norms constitute evolution: as the relative frequencies change, so do the
 corresponding characteristics of the population. In both cases, the competition can
 have two kinds of outcomes: one of the contestants prevails absolutely and the other
 disappears; or the competitors can coexist within the population for long periods.
 Genetic Inheritance
 To draw the analogy between norms and genes as entities that provide instructions
 to their host organisms on what to do in response to given environmental stimuli,
 we begin with a very simplified description of genetic inheritance.5 Variations in
 traits among members of a population occur at the level of the gene, and are
 expressed in the phenotype (the physical form, functioning, and behavior of an
 organism). Genes are pieces of chromosomes, DNA strands, that convey informa-
 4 Although the idea remains controversial when applied to humans, the contention that most animal behavior is
 genetically based is well documented. See, for example, Wilson, 1975. For an overview of the argument that there is a
 genetically based "human nature" that affects much of human behavior, see Wright, 1994.
 5 The following account draws from several biology textbooks, including Mettler et al. (1988), Starr (1991), Wilson
 (1975), and Biological Science (1990). Dawkins (1987) provides a highly readable popular account.
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 tion about how to construct all the bits and pieces that make up an organism. They
 are instructions about what to do with available resources under given environ-
 mental conditions.6 These genes, these coded bits of information, are passed from
 an organism to its offspring, in the sense that the information contained in the
 offspring's gene is exactly the same as the information contained in the parent's
 gene.7 The survival time of an individual physical gene is at best the same as that
 of its host organism and usually much less, but the survival of a specific physical
 gene is not what interests us here. Rather, it is the replication of the coded
 information from the parent's genes to the offspring's genes that matters.
 Those genes that create host organisms that survive and reproduce by definition
 have greater survival power than genes whose organisms do not reproduce. This is
 what is meant by the "survival of the fittest" imposed by natural selection. "Fitness"
 means the property of increasing the likelihood that the host organism will success-
 fully reproduce-that is, create new hosts for the gene, hosts that will themselves
 successfully reproduce. A gene's fitness, or reproductive value, is not permanent. It
 may change over time as different environmental conditions affect the successive
 generations of host bodies through which the gene is passed or as other traits
 become established in the population.
 Within a species, a given trait is controlled by a gene that occupies a specific,
 invariant slot on a given chromosome. If eye color is controlled by gene 7642 on
 chromosome 21 in one individual, the gene at slot 7642 on chromosome 21 in
 another individual will also control eye color, although the color may be different.
 The "address" is fixed, but the content may vary (Dawkins, 1987:117). These
 variants are competitors for that slot, and are known as alleles. Alleles do not directly
 compete: they do not slug it out to determine who gets access to the chromosome
 being passed on to offspring. Instead, some members of a species will carry one set
 of alleles and some will carry other alleles. Over many generations, those members
 of the species carrying one allele may reproduce more successfully than those
 carrying the other; the former will increase in frequency in the population relative
 to the latter; we call the first the more "fit." That is all that is meant by "fitness."
 Competition with alleles is only a part of the natural selection story. Single genes
 rarely determine the reproductive success of their host organisms. Rather, genes
 must interact with a wide range of other genes contained in the same host body.
 Thus, part of the gene's ability to survive and be reproduced depends on the quality
 of its interaction with other genes. It must compete with its alleles, but it must also
 cooperate with a far larger number of other genes contained in the same host
 organism.
 Finally, survival depends on the interaction of the organism-the phenotype in
 which the genetic instructions are expressed-with its environment, that is, with
 anything external to the population of organisms. Environmental factors for bio-
 logical organisms include climate, predators, prey, the availability of water, and
 anything else that affects the organism's survival.
 Population genetics explains changes in the characteristics of biological popula-
 tions over time as the result of evolution through natural selection. The term "local
 population" (often called merely "population") refers more specifically to all the
 members of a species living in a defined geographical area at the same time (Wilson,
 1975:9). Evolution is the process of cumulative changes over time in the charac-
 teristics of a population of organisms (Starr, 1991:8). The international system-the
 6 In literal terms, they are instructions to the cell about what proteins to synthesize.
 7 In asexual reproduction, this is literally true except for the rare random mutation. In sexual reproduction, as
 described above, the process is more complex, but on average the offspring's chromosomes will contain 50 percent of
 its mother's genetic information and 50 percent of its father's.
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 "population" of states-changes its characteristics, or evolves, over time. The
 underlying mechanism is the same in both biological and norm evolution: natural
 selection, causing some genes or norms to become more prevalent in a population
 and others to decline in frequency.
 The theory of natural selection says that evolution occurs because of the selective
 survival and reproduction of certain traits within a population (Darwin, 1859).
 Those traits that confer some reproductive advantage will, by definition, be repro-
 duced more often than others. Over time, those traits will come to dominate in a
 population. In more formal terms, selection is "the change in relative frequency in
 genotypes due to differences in the ability of their phenotypes to obtain repre-
 sentation in the next generation" (Wilson, 1975:67). If that population is isolated,
 the changes over time may be great enough that the isolated population will become
 a new species, unable to interbreed with its progenitor. Although it now seems
 self-evident if not tautological, the theory was a brilliant insight at a time when
 genetics was effectively unknown, the fossil record too incomplete to prove that
 populations change over time, and prevailing ideology insisted that all species had
 been separately created.
 Evolution by natural selection is characterized by two traits: it is cumulative; and
 it is nonteleological. Cumulative change means that a long series of very small
 changes may lead to very substantial results. A series of very minor but cumulative
 improvements in the light-sensing capability of a single-celled organism can, given
 enough time, result in the complexity of an eagle's eye. In biology, these cumulative
 changes result in the extraordinarily rich diversity and complexity of life in all its
 species. Evolution has created millions of types of organisms, each seemingly
 designed to fit into the niche it occupies. Nonetheless, the evolutionary process itself
 is entirely nonteleological. Evolution has no end product "in mind." Rather, it
 consists of a series of adaptations to changing environmental conditions. An
 adaptation that is beneficial at one moment may quickly become useless, or even
 harmful, if conditions change. Those millions of "well-designed" species reflect only
 a small fraction of the species that have ever existed. The rest have become extinct
 because their "design" did not fit the prevailing or changing conditions of their
 time.
 Natural selection causes evolution to occur if three conditions are met. First is the
 existence of some type of variation in the characteristics of the members of a
 population. There must be differences to choose among. Second, there must be
 some system of reproduction of these characteristics. Third is the presence of some
 type of competition among the variants such that not all are reproduced with equal
 frequency. In other words, some variants must have some reproductive advantage
 in the population, something that causes them to be reproduced more often than
 others.
 The analogy here is to natural selection, not to evolution. That is, I am not just
 arguing that change occurs in the characteristics of the population of states, but that
 this change is the result of competition among norms that are reproduced at
 different rates and that thus come to have different frequencies in the population
 of states. Norms are subject to forces of natural selection because they meet all the
 criteria necessary for natural selection to occur. Variation is present in the form of
 competing norms. Norms are transmitted-reproduced-from one individual to
 another (in this case from one state to another). Different norms have different levels
 of reproductive advantage, different likelihoods of being transmitted. Given two
 contested norms, one may be more prominent in the norm pool, more compatible
 with other prevailing norms, and/or better suited to the existing environmental
 conditions than the other. If so, that one will become more frequent in the
 population relative to the other.
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 Evolutionary Concepts in Internatianal Relations Theoiy8
 This population genetics approach differs strikingly from the usual ways in which
 evolutionary concepts have been applied-or misapplied-in international rela-
 tions theory. Most notorious were the social Darwinists, who claimed that the
 dominance of Western states reflected their superior "fitness" and was thus not only
 inevitable but desirable (Spencer, 1876-97; Bagehot, 1891; Hofstadter, [1944]
 1992). Such applications were based on a fundamental misunderstanding, if not a
 deliberate misuse, of the basic idea of evolution through natural selection-that
 "fitness" is a purely contingent phenomenon. If some individuals or groups prosper
 while others falter, this means nothing about their relative virtue. It means only that
 the former happened to have a combination of attributes, resources, and/or luck
 that better met the environmental demands of the moment than did the latter.
 Neorealism discards the racism but, at least implicitly, retains the focus on natural
 selection. Yet it too suffers from a misapplication of basic evolutionary principles.
 Population biology, like international relations theory, has levels of analysis. Natural
 selection can be analyzed as working at the level of the gene (norm), the whole
 organism (state), or the entire population of organisms (system). For the analogy to
 provide useful insight, we must be careful to choose the appropriate level of analysis.
 Neorealism looks at states or firms as organisms and analyzes how natural selection
 operates on those organisms. But under the conditions prevailing in the late
 twentieth century, selection rarely works directly on the state. The usual analogy
 drawn between organisms and states is inappropriate.9
 In organic evolution, the only way to change the relative frequencies of genes is
 to create new members of the population through reproduction, with different
 genotypes having different levels of success in reproducing themselves. Thus,
 selection works by killing off organisms (or more accurately, by preventing them
 from reproducing) at varying rates, depending on how well their phenotype meets
 the environmental conditions of the moment. Once conceived, individual members
 of the population cannot change their genetic endowment.
 The neorealist selection argument maintains this focus on selection at the level
 of the organism, with the "organism" being defined as a state. Most accounts of the
 formation of states and the European state system are, at least implicitly, theories
 of evolution by natural selection (Anderson, 1979; Parker, 1988; Tilly, 1990).
 Polities that adopted a centralized authority with exclusive legitimate control of the
 means of violence in a given territory-that is, became states-survived. Other
 polities where authority remained fragmented, like Poland, were wiped out. Selec-
 f The natural and social sciences have long borrowed ideas from each other. Malthus attributed his ideas about the
 devastating consequences of human population growth to a biological observation by Benjamin Franklin that "there is
 no bound to the prolific nature of plants or animals but what is made by their crowding and interfering with each other's
 means of subsistence" (cited in Hirshleifer, 1977: 4-5). Darwin in turn acknowledged that his theory of natural selection
 was inspired by his reading of Malthus: "In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry,
 I happened to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population,' and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for
 existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once
 struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved and unfavorable ones to be
 destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species" (cited in Hofstadter, [1994] 1992: 39).
 9 The gene is the ultimate source of biological evolution, because it is the unit of instruction for each individual trait,
 and it is mutations in genes that create variation in traits among members of a population. However, in sexually
 reproducing species, which are the vast majority of all species, the more immediate source of change is the mixing of
 the two parents' genes. This extensive mixing leads to great variation among offspring. Most of these offspring in most
 species do not survive to reproduce. Thus selection can work strongly on each new generation. For this reason, many
 evolutionary biologists argue that natural selection works primarily at the level of the whole organism, because that is
 where the variation is primarily present (Mayr, 1991). Although genetic mutation is the ultimate source of genetic
 variation, mutations do not occur nearly as often as does the random recombination of genes in sexual reproduction.
 Indeed, it is likely that sexual reproduction evolved precisely because it enables favorable new combinations of genes
 to emerge much more rapidly than is possible in asexual species (Wilson, 1975: 316).
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 tion in this case strongly favored a particular allele over its competitor. For this era,
 when the nature of states was largely shaped by their ability to wage war and resist
 aggression, a selection model at the level of the state may well be appropriate. But
 the analogy no longer holds up. International norm change depends upon changes
 in the percentage of a population of states holding a given norm, not on the
 elimination of the state. Existing states can change the norms they hold. States,
 especially major powers, tend to persist in some recognizably continuous form over
 fairly long periods. In the state system, evolution primarily occurs not by wiping out
 some states and replacing them with others having different characteristics, but by
 supporting nonrandom changes in the behavior of existing states-that is, by
 rewarding the behaviors that express certain norms and penalizing other behaviors,
 but with penalties that fall short of the ultimate penalty of extinction. In the era of
 trading states and prohibitions against interstate aggression, when war among
 major powers is no longer the primary means of international change, this level of
 analysis is less useful (Rosecrance, 1986; Mueller, 1989).
 Moreover, neorealism uses the selection principle to explain stasis, not change.
 It implicitly describes natural selection as a mechanism for limiting the amount and
 type of variation that can occur, rather than for bringing about change. In the
 competition in the marketplace, some firms do better than others, in Waltz's words,
 "whether through intelligence, skill, hard work, or dumb luck ... [and] either their
 competitors emulate them or they fall by the wayside" (1979:77). What is being
 selected is behavior that helps the organism to survive over time-that is, to replicate
 itself temporally. Only a very small set of behaviors will permit the firm, or the state,
 to survive. In the neorealist framework, survival requires maximization of relative
 power, therefore only states that behave as though they are trying to maximize
 power will reproduce themselves over time. Selection pressures are fostered by the
 anarchic, and thus competitive, environment in which states find themselves, as a
 result of which states must behave "as if' they were rational if they are to survive.
 They "must" have preferences for wealth and power or they will cease to exist. Those
 that have certain characteristics (such as a concern for relative gains, relatively high
 shares of military and economic power, and the ability to choose strategies that
 maintain or increase those shares) will survive. Others will not.
 If states were simply replaced by other states that were in no way different, no
 change in overall patterns of behavior would occur in the population of states. And
 most change that does occur in the international system takes place within the
 framework of existing states, not by eradicating states. No states disappeared
 (although many were created) when colonialism became unacceptable, nor did
 norm changes associated with the abolition of slavery or the nonuse of nuclear
 weapons depend on the death of states that did not share these norms. Evolution
 ultimately occurs at the level of the gene, and this is the appropriate parallel for
 considering the evolution of norms. By following the evolutionary journey from the
 perspective of the gene, or norm, rather than from the perspective of the organism,
 we get much better insight into factors accounting for norm change.
 Cultural Evolution: The Genetic Analogy
 It has long been noted that human society, like biological populations, undergoes
 a kind of evolution. Although we humans are biological organisms ourselves, and
 we exist in our current physical form purely as the result of the same genetic
 evolutionary forces that have shaped all other species on this planet, change among
 humans is no longer primarily the result of biological evolution. Far more dramatic
 and significant are the changes in human behavior governed by social and cultural
 forces.
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 A wide range of social scientists have applied the selection model to the evolution
 of human cultural traits, and it is this model that best applies to the evolution of
 international norms. Scholars such as Donald Campbell (1969, 1987) have tried to
 spell out the societal counterparts of variation, selection, and retention that would
 enable sociocultural evolution to occur. Anthropologists and sociologists have
 applied these basic principles to the transmission of human culture (Boyd and
 Richerson, 1985). They argue that human behavior, unlike the behavior of animals,
 is largely culturally rather than genetically determined. Since culture is transmitted
 from one generation to the nextjust as genes are, culture can evolve in a way broadly
 similar to genetic evolution. Because humans acquire norms socially from one
 another as well as through direct experience, humans can pass phenotypic traits of
 behavior directly from individual to individual far more readily than do other
 animals. These behavioral traits can spread throughout a human population just as
 genetic traits do, but far more quickly.
 The most cogent argument for the evolution of human ideas independent of
 genetic evolution is the work of biologist Richard Dawkins (1989:ch. 1 1) on the
 concept of "memes"-a cultural equivalent of genes. He points out that genes matter
 because they are replicators. They are portions of chromosomal material that are
 copied with remarkable fidelity from one generation to the next.10 However,
 Dawkins says, there is no reason to assume that genes are the only possible types of
 replicators. Ideas that are transmitted culturally are a new type of replicator, one
 that is "achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting far
 behind" (Dawkins, 1989:192).
 Dawkins calls these new replicators "memes." A meme is a unit of information
 that is replicated through imitation or cultural transmission, just as a gene is a unit
 of chromosomal information that is replicated through sexual or asexual reproduc-
 tion. A meme can be any kind of idea: a fashion fad, a musical jingle, the Ten
 Commandments. Norms, by my definition, are a subset of memes having to do with
 accepted standards of behavior, and international norms are a sub-subset having to
 do with the behavior of states.
 For the process of natural selection to work on memes as it does on genes, certain
 conditions must be met (Boyd and Richerson, 1995:11). A gene or meme must be
 inherited-that is, passed on from one individual to another. There must be some
 way in which the coded information, the gene or the meme, is expressed in a
 phenotype. In the case of genes, the coded information is expressed in an organism.
 Sometimes this expression is the physical body, but it can also be behavioral. In the
 case of international norms, the memes of interest to this study, the expression is
 the behavior of states. As with genes, the extent to which a given meme is expressed
 in its organism's phenotype depends in part on environmental conditions and in
 part on the meme's interaction with other memes. There must be variation of beliefs
 or values in the population: different alleles among which selection can pick and
 choose. In biology, random mutation serves as the source of the requisite variation,
 that is, errors in the replication of DNA. The origin of specific ideas or norms, on
 the other hand, is often unknown. It is intuitively plausible that some variation comes
 from "copying errors," misunderstandings of the information conveyed by a meme.
 This is particularly plausible with regard to norms of international behavior, which
 usually operate in a very noisy and confusing environment. However, the source of
 variation is not crucial to the selection argument. As long as variation exists, which
 10 The DNA of a typical animal cell contains three billion nucleotide pairs, all ofwhich are copied during replication.
 Initially, there is about one error in every 1,000 nucleotides. However, the cell has a proofreading system based on
 enzymes. Some enzymes detect and remove incorrect or damaged nucleotides, which are then replaced with a correct
 sequence synthesized by other enzymes. After repairs, the error rate is about one in a billion (Biological Science, 1990: 213).
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 it clearly does in cultures and in the international state system as well as in organisms,
 selection can occur.
 The variation must affect actors' behavior in ways that alter the probability that
 they transmit those beliefs or values. Those memes "that cause people to behave in
 ways that make it more likely that their [memes] are transmitted will increase" (Boyd
 and Richerson, 1995:1 1). For example, a religious norm calling on its adherents to
 have large numbers of children and to proselytize actively is more likely to spread
 than is a norm that requires that followers neither procreate nor proselytize, as
 witness the respective fates of the Mormons and the Shakers.
 Dawkins (1989:323-4) cites a simple example that makes it clear how the
 characteristics of a "mutant" meme may have survival value for that meme itself.
 The refrain to the song "Auld Lang Syne" is now almost always rendered "for the
 sake of auld lang syne," although Burns actually wrote, "For auld lang syne." Why
 should the interpolated phrase have survived and driven out the original wording?
 Dawkins speculates that the mutant form arose as a rare but insidiously penetrating
 variant. Anyone who has ever sung in a choir knows how obtrusive "s" sounds are
 when sung, and "k" is nearly as obtrusive. Most people learn the song from hearing
 it as a child, not seeing the words written. Once the error arises because one
 inaccurate participant chimes in (and the interpolated phrase does fit the song more
 easily than does the original wording), the "mutant" version will be heard more
 readily than the accurate one, and thus it will spread to more and more members
 of the population who are learning the song for the first time.
 The point of this example is that there is no advantage to the members of the
 population one way or the other. The advantage is to the mutant meme itself. In
 short, we should look for the evolutionary advantage of a norm to the norm itself,
 not to its host organism. Obviously, a norm that is lethal to all potential hosts cannot
 last, but most behavioral decisions are not nearly so stark.
 There must also be some limit on the number of memes that can exist in the given
 population, so that there is competition among the memes for existence. Memes
 do not have physical alleles as genes do. Memes do not literally compete for the
 same space in the human brain. Rather, as Dawkins (1989:197) notes, they "com-
 pete" for time and attention from their human hosts. This is true of memes
 generally, as an individual mind can contain a large but not infinite variety of
 memes. In organizations, the competition among memes may take the form of
 struggles between individuals or subunits of the organization, as well as within the
 mind of any given individual.
 With regard to norms, which call for specific behaviors, the competition is
 relatively direct. An actor cannot follow two opposed norms at once. However, when
 norm variation is present, that is, when neither of the competing norms has driven
 the other to extinction, it is quite possible either for the population to be polymor-
 phic (with some actors following one norm and some the other), or for an individual
 actor to pursue a mixed strategy, following one norm on some occasions and its
 competitor on others. 11
 1I The genetic parallel here is strong. There is far more genetic variation within populations than could exist if one
 allele always drove another to extinction. Several factors can account for the continued su-vival of competing alleles
 within a population. The one that is relevant to social evolution is the possibility of frequency-dependent selection. This
 can happen if one allele is more frequent than the other, and organisms with the rarer allele gain some advantage from
 its scarcity. For example, the more common type may be preferentially attacked by predators or parasites who adjust
 their attack strategy to the more common type. As the rarer allele becomes relatively more common, predato-s may
 start to shift their strategies to attack this formerly rare allele. The two alleles will remain at this intermediate frequency,
 the point at which the rarer allele begins to lose the advantage of scarcity (Wilson, 1975: 70-1).
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 The Evolutionary Approach to International Norms
 To this point, the argument has attempted to show three things: (1) There is a
 gaping hole in the mainstream neorealist/neoliberal literature concerning how and
 why norms change over time; (2) concepts drawn from population genetics are
 appropriate to use in explaining norm change; and (3) theories of international
 relations that examine selection at the level of the state rather than at the level of
 the norm cannot provide insight into norm change. Now we are ready to develop
 the evolutionary model of norm change.
 Norms, like genes, carry instructions. In organic evolution, the entity being
 instructed is a single biological organism. The evolutionary analogy is broadly
 appropriate for norms operating in any type of social grouping. In the norm
 analogy, the entity being instructed could be an individual, a state, or whatever other
 social grouping is most useful for purposes of analysis. To examine changes in state
 behavior, as we do here, obviously the appropriate entity to consider is the state as
 the "organism" that carries out the behavioral instructions of the norm.
 This provides a framework within which changes over time in the substance of
 internationally held norms can be explained. Norms evolve because they are subject
 to selection. The genetic analogy suggests that, as with any instructional unit subject
 to selection, three factors account for the reproductive success or failure of a
 contested norm: (1) whether a norm becomes prominent enough in the norm pool
 to gain a foothold; (2) how well it interacts with other prevailing norms with which
 it is not in competition, that is, the "normative environment"; and (3) what external
 environmental conditions confront the norm pool. No one of these is sufficient to
 determine the path of a norm's evolution. Each is a necessary but not sufficient
 condition.
 Prominence. Norm "prominence" is a shorthand way of saying that a new muta-
 tion, no matter how favorable to fitness, is likely to need some help in getting
 established in the norm pool. This is an exact parallel to genetic evolution, where
 "even advantageous mutations are usually lost in the first few-generations because
 of genetic segregation and random variation of offspring" (Lewontin, 1974:27-8).
 The intuition behind this is straightforward. Reproduction, whether of norms or of
 genes, takes place in a very noisy environment filled with confounding factors. If a
 new mutant is contained in a host organism that never has an opportunity to
 reproduce for reasons unrelated to the mutation, that mutation is gone unless it
 happens to arise again spontaneously elsewhere under more favorable circum-
 stances. A bird born with far better eyesight than its siblings has a clear advantage,
 but one that will be wasted if the bird happens to be eaten by a predator while still
 a helpless infant. The same reasoning applies to cultural mutations as well. The
 most brilliant technological innovation will not diffuse if it is created by an inventor
 who dies without telling anyone of his invention. Individuals living in a police state
 may find it physically impossible to reproduce-that is, spread to others-norms
 about personal freedom.
 Gene "prominence" usually occurs when a subpopulation becomes geographi-
 cally isolated, essentially reducing the size of the gene pool in which new mutants
 must compete. Such may also be the case for norms below the level of the interna-
 tional state system. Societies had far more divergent norms when various regions of
 the world were isolated from one another. But since the subject of interest here is
 norms that are transmitted across state borders, not norms that are held exclusively
 within a given state, we must look for other explanations of how international norms
 gain that critical first toehold. International norm prominence generally occurs
 either because someone is actively promoting the norm, or because the state where
 the mutant norm first arose happens to be particularly conspicuous.
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 Norms are most likely to obtain their initial foothold through the efforts of a
 "norm entrepreneur," an individual or organization that sets out to change the
 behavior of others.12 There is strong and growing evidence that norm entrepre-
 neurs have been at work in the evolution of a wide range of norms. Nadelmann
 (1990) has referred to the importance of "moral entrepreneurs" in legitimizing or
 delegitimizing behavior and thus changing norms. Finnemore (1996) has traced
 several cases in which international or nongovernmental organizations acted as
 "teachers" to change states' conceptions of their interests. Mueller (1989) has
 documented the role of a handful of individuals in changing attitudes toward major
 war as an acceptable instrument of policy.
 Although a norm entrepreneur need not be a powerful state (and in the cases
 cited above is often an individual or a small group), such states do have obvious
 advantages if they wish to try to create a new norm. The U.S., for example, interacts
 in a wide range of fora and situations with virtually all other states. Small states, on
 the other hand, may not be able to afford to have even sketchy diplomatic repre-
 sentation in many other states, much less participate regularly and substantially in
 whatever international organizations, conferences, or other fora may be relevant.
 In this way power, in the sense of communications resources, may be a significant
 part of the norm story. Norms held by powerful actors simply have many more
 opportunities to reproduce through the greater number of opportunities afforded
 to powerful states to persuade others of the rightness of their views.
 An international norm may also begin to spread in the absence of a norm
 entrepreneur if some states simply emulate the behavior of some prestigious or
 otherwise well known actor, even if the emulated actor is not attempting to
 communicate its behavior. Because it is difficult to know how successful a particular
 strategy actually is compared to other possible behaviors, people look for clues as
 to which behavior they should adopt. Boyd and Richerson (1995:9) point out that
 such bias is evident in the transmission of innovations through personal contact.
 Although it is rational for people to adopt innovations when they observe that
 someone they know who has already adopted the innovation has succeeded, it is
 also common for an innovation to be emulated because the person who has already
 adopted it has prestige. No one believes that it is the shoes he wears that make
 Michael Jordan the greatest basketball player of all time, yet advertisers are willing
 to pay enormous sums to have his prestige associated with their product. Similarly,
 in the state system norms may become widespread simply because they are initially
 adopted by one or more very large states, even in the absence of direct efforts by
 those large states to induce similar behavior from others.
 This issue of prominence raises a key question: How much is enough? Prominence
 is by definition a relative phenomenon, one that is not easily measured in the
 abstract. Discussions of prominence teeter perilously close to the tautology so often
 seen in discussions of power: that if one sees an outcome, it shows that an actor had
 been powerful "enough" to bring about that outcome. The difference is that power
 is usually taken to be a sole cause, whereas prominence is merely a necessary
 condition. Nonetheless, the theory here remains underspecified.
 The international norms that have been studied generally did benefit either from
 the activities of a norm entrepreneur or from the good fortune of having originated
 with a prominent actor, and sometimes both. But, in international relations, as in
 biological evolution, contingency plays a major role as well. Deliberate efforts to
 promote particular norms may work-or they may not. Norm entrepreneurship is
 usually necessary, but it is never sufficient.
 12 The term "norm entrepreneur" was used by John Mueller at a conference on "The Emergence of New Norms in
 Personal and International Behavior" held at UCLA, May 1993.
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 Coherence. In the genetic analogy, environment is usually taken to be anything
 external to the organism. But by moving the focus to the level of the individual gene,
 or norm, we see that there is a crucial but often overlooked part of that environment:
 the other genes of the species. Since genes are reproduced down through genera-
 tions, and may exist simultaneously in many members of a species, the relevant
 group of genes is the whole gene pool of the species, not just the genes contained
 in a single organism in which a given copy of a gene happens to find itself. A given
 gene's reproductive success depends heavily on how well it interacts with the rest of
 the gene pool. As Dawkins has put it:
 Genes for making teeth suitable for chewing meat tend to be favoured in a
 "climate"dominated by genes making guts suitable for digesting meat. Conversely,
 genes for making plant-grinding teeth tend to be favoured in a climate dominated
 by genes that make guts suitable for digesting plants. And vice versa in both cases.
 Teams of "meat-eating genes" tend to evolve together, and teams of "plant-eating
 genes" tend to evolve together. (1987:172)
 The normative analogy to such genetic coevolution has to do with the question
 of legitimacy. No norm exists in a vacuum. The social relationships in which states
 are enmeshed depend on a web of shared normative understandings about what
 behavior is acceptable. Any new norm must fit coherently with other existing
 norms-that is, with the rest of the "genotype." A norm's legitimacy depends
 crucially on such coherence, and coherence in turn engenders legitimacy.
 Although legitimacy is widely acknowledged to play a crucial role in shaping
 international behavior, few scholars have successfully probed this particular mine-
 field. They often simply assert that standard behaviors become standards of behav-
 ior over time, without attempting to explain the process by which practices become
 legitimized.13 How does "we've always done it this way" become "this is the way it
 should be"?
 Thomas Franck (1990) has outlined several factors that tend to render a norm
 "legitimate" in the eyes of the affected actors. Franck (1990:24) defines legitimacy
 as:
 a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward
 compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that
 the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally
 accepted principles of right process.
 This property is a matter of the degree to which a norm (or rule, in Franck's
 terminology) possesses certain characteristics. One is determinacy-that is, the
 extent to which the standard is clear to those who are expected to adhere to it and
 falls within the bounds ofjustice and reason. The more important is coherence: that
 is, the extent to which a norm is logically related to its own principled purpose, to
 "principles previously employed to solve similar problems," and to "a lattice of
 principles in use to resolve different problems" (Franck, 1990:147-8). The commu-
 nity of states is, in this view, a community bound by shared rules that are usually
 (but not always) codified in international law. The members of this community act
 according to recognized rules and interpret the meaning of each other's behavior
 according to those rules (Franck, 1990:203).
 A new norm acquires legitimacy within the rule community when it is itself a
 reasonable behavioral response to the environmental conditions facing the mem-
 bers of the community and when it "fits" coherently with other prevailing norms
 13 As Oran Young (1983: 95) has said, "The rise of conventionalized behavior is apt to engender widespread feelings
 of legitimacy or propriety in conjunction with specific institutional arrangements."
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 accepted by the members of the community. This is similar to the concept of
 institutionalization used by both mainstream and constructivist theorists. Because
 most existing norms are codified in international law, emerging norms must make
 the case that they are logical extensions of that law-or necessary changes to it.
 Indeed, a vast amount of international negotiation is in essence argument over
 whether specific potential new norms are acceptable extensions of the existing
 normative framework embodied in international law. Such negotiations constitute
 a key selection mechanism for norms. Norms that are highly coherent within the
 international legal framework will be far more resistant to change than those that
 are not so linked. 14
 Environment. The "population" of interest in the evolutionary approach is the
 population of norms, not the population of states. States are part of the environ-
 mental conditions facing norms. In other words, the environmental conditions that
 face a norm of international behavior are familiar from standard neorealist accounts
 of the factors that explain international relations: the distribution of power, which
 in turn encompasses the prevailing level of technology and the availability of natural
 and human resources. Unlike the neorealist approach, however, the evolutionary
 paradigm sees such environmental factors as merely a part of the story, not a
 sufficient explanation of fundamental behavioral change. Certain technological or
 other resources or certain distributions of power may be necessary for the repro-
 duction of a mutant norm, but they are not sufficient.
 The Reproductive Mechanism
 The three factors of initial prominence, coherence, and environmental conditions
 explain which norms will be selected, but not how they will spread. To the extent
 that the existing literature on norms and ideas has considered how norms are
 transmitted if not simply by power, most scholars have focused on the need for a
 crisis to shake decision makers out of their bureaucratic lethargy and inspire them
 to uncover new ways of doing things (Weber, 1991). Even if this is true, it tells us
 nothing about which new ways will be chosen, nor what an individual actor will do.
 In population biology, it is assumed that strategies are linked to some genetic
 component on which natural selection can work. What is the mechanism that tells
 an individual state which strategy it should adopt?
 This question of the reproductive mechanism inevitably leads us to the most
 complex issue in the evolutionary explanation of norm change: the role of thinking.
 Clearly, norms and genes are not perfect parallels. A biological organism does not
 have much choice about whether the instructions contained in its genes are ex-
 pressed in the phenotype. Organisms have not-to date-been able either to choose
 which of their genes they wish to pass on or to deliberately modify those genes before
 passing them on. Natural selection has worked quite coldly by killing off organisms
 whose genes create less fit phenotypes, thus preventing them from passing on those
 genes to offspring. People, unlike nature, can reason. Their reasoning may be faulty,
 randomly or systematically biased, or based on woefully incomplete information,
 but it does occur and cannot be ignored. Human minds can, to some extent, modify
 memes and consciously select among competing alleles to decide which ones to
 accept as well as pass on. The "inherited effects of use and disuse" that Darwin (1891)
 wrongly thought to be part of natural selection clearly do play a role with memes.
 Human agents do have choice-in fact, they must choose to act if the instructions
 embedded in a norm are to be carried out.
 14 I am grateful to George Modelski for pointing out the importance of international law in this context.
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 The evolutionary argument is based on a fundamental assumption that human
 "choices" about behavior are based far more on simple imitation, encoded in the
 form of a norm, than on deliberate weighing of well-considered and well-under-
 stood options. These processes are much less rational than rational choice theory
 would have us believe. Even norms that originate and begin to spread through
 rational processes are subject to selection pressures that are inherently nonrational.
 Norm reproduction can take one of two forms, vertical or horizontal.15 Vertical
 reproduction refers to continuation of a norm or set of norms through new
 generations of leaders within a single state. Except for the occasional copying error,
 vertically reproduced norms rarely change. Successful norms are thus inherited
 vertically, passed down through the generations. It must be stressed that "success"
 here does not imply superiority. It simply means evolutionary "fitness."
 Horizontal reproduction refers to emulation: actors see others behaving in a
 certain way and copy those behaviors. Emulation, or the horizontal reproduction of
 a norm across actors within a single generation, is the mechanism by which norms
 change: a state following norm x sees another state behaving in accordance with
 norm y and replaces x with y. This horizontal mechanism allows for the rapidity
 with which new norms can spread, replacing well-entrenched standards seemingly
 in the blink of an eye. Rapid social change usually reflects horizontal emulation.
 Horizontal spread is a much faster means of copying than is vertical transmission
 down generations. Proselytization-persuading others to emulate one's behav-
 ior-is likely to be far more successful in spreading a new religion than is having
 many children, even if all of the children could be persuaded to adopt the parents'
 beliefs.
 When do we expect to see horizontal rather than vertical reproduction-that is,
 change rather than perpetuation of the status quo? There are three conditions that
 would favor horizontal reproduction: (1) large-scale turnover of decision makers,
 as in revolutions; (2) clear failure of the behavioral norms of the previous "genera-
 tion" to the extent that the previous way of doing things becomes virtually impos-
 sible; or (3) the emergence of a new issues area in which prevailing norms are not
 yet well established and thus there is little scope for vertical reproduction because
 most states do not have much in the way of relevant existing norms to be reproduced.
 If emulation is the primary mechanism by which norms change, what accounts
 for which norms are emulated? A (boundedly) rational choice perspective would
 presume that "successful" norms would be imitated. In this view, rather than
 assessing all conceivable alternatives, states assess only the alternative behaviors (the
 phenotypes of norms) that are currently available in the norm pool, then adopt the
 one that has proved most successful for other actors. But the difficulties of deter-
 mining which norms actually account for an actor's success makes it unlikely that a
 purely rational selection of successful strategies can explain which behaviors are
 emulated. The net benefit of a behavior may be hard to distinguish from the effects
 of other behaviors or of factors that have nothing to do with human behavior. As
 Boyd and Richerson (1995:12) note, "Because the world is complicated and poorly
 understood and the effects of many decisions are experienced over the course of a
 lifetime, [estimates about the effects of alternative behaviors] will be imperfect."
 If there are contested norms applicable to a given situation, which one is selected
 will depend on the three factors that have been stressed throughout: the relative
 prominence of each of the contested norms, their relative compatibility or coher-
 ence with other prevailing norms, and the extent to which they fit the existing
 environmental conditions. In other words, horizontal transmission of norms re-
 15Axelrod (1986) suggests that trial and error by a single individual provides a third evolutionary mechanism for
 norm spread. But there is no "inheritance" in the trial and error approach. It is better considered a form of learning
 than a form of evolution.
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 quires that the same processes take place within as across states. A given state will
 usually contain some degree of normative heterogeneity, providing the variation
 necessary for selection to occur. Horizontal transmission is merely the changing of
 relative frequencies within a state until such point that the state's decision makers
 consistently adhere to the new norm. The complete story of norm evolution is thus
 a two-level game, with the three factors of prominence, coherence, and environ-
 mental conditions applying domestically as well as internationally. A complete
 account of international norm change would require empirical investigation of the
 domestic politics of all relevant states. But such completeness is unnecessary. The
 process by which variation initially arises may well be unique to each state, but as
 argued above, the origin of a mutant norm or new idea matters little to the
 evolutionary story. To explain why new norms spread throughout many states, the
 argument at the systemic level suffices.
 The Advantages of Emulation. Why should emulation be a far more common, if
 unconscious, decision mechanism than is rational choice? Emulation has distinct
 advantages, especially in complex or novel situations. Trial and error is a slow,
 cumbersome, even dangerous process. It is much easier and safer to allow others to
 undergo the trials and make the errors. As Waltz (1954:220) cites Bismarck as saying,
 "Fools learn by experience; wise men learn by other people's experience." Yet this
 tells us nothing about the underlying mechanism by which actors are deciding what
 to emulate. Is there a complex and sophisticated cognitive process going on? Are
 "wise men" actually learning from other people's experience in the sense that they
 understand why the other people's behavior was successful or unsuccessful in
 achieving a certain goal, or even what the goal was and whether it was achieved?
 And how, if at all, does "learning" apply to changes of moral or social norms, where
 the question of success or failure in the instrumental sense does not arise?
 Cohen and Axelrod (1984) have put forward a "surprise" model of the decision
 process incorporating a controlled form of preference change in which imitation
 proves to be more successful than rational choice as a means of achieving goals. The
 theory is both a normative "approach to the problem of improving your perform-
 ance when you don't completely understand what you are doing" and a descriptive
 account of "some of the ways in which preferences do in fact change as a function
 of experience" (Cohen and Axelrod, 1984:31). They assume that actors have both
 very limited rationality and underlying models of the world that are fundamentally
 at variance with reality, both plausible assumptions to apply to nation-states. Thus,
 new information gets incorporated into a skewed view of the world. If such actors
 change their preferences to imitate those of a successful or prestigious actor, they
 may accomplish their original goals better than if they had pursued those goals
 directly.
 In a chess game, for example, rational calculation of the outcome of each move
 is impossible (Cohen and Axelrod, 1984:31-2). Over time, players have developed
 a series of heuristic rules (a bishop is worth more than a rook, and a rook is worth
 more than a pawn) that provide intermediary goals-preferences-that help players
 to make decisions during the course of the game. Over time, those heuristic rules
 that most help players to win the game-that is, those that most closely correspond
 to the underlying reality of the relative value of different pieces-survive, and other
 rules are discarded. In other words, a preference for keeping a rook at the cost of
 losing a bishop will cause a player to lose more often than a preference for the bishop
 over the rook. This is true whether or not the player understands that the bishop is
 more useful than the rook in the ultimate goal of protecting one's king and capturing
 the opponent's. Novice chess players will win more often if they emulate these
 heuristics long before they have come to understand the logical bases for them.
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 In complex situations or when dealing with incomplete information, in other
 words, it may be better to do what others do than to try to decide one's own optimal
 strategy, even if you do not understand why the others are doing what they are
 doing, or even if they do not understand why they are doing what they are doing.
 Because complexity and uncertainty characterize so much of the human condition,
 it is certainly plausible that people would tend to use emulation rather than more
 cognitively difficult processes to decide behavior. This need not lead to nonrational
 or even suboptimal outcomes, but the process is certainly not rational in the usual
 sense.
 This emulation is not "learning" in the sense of necessarily reflecting an improved
 understanding of the causal relationship between behavior and outcomes. Indeed,
 if states could "learn" one would not expect to see rapid policy convergence. In the
 learning model, argues Levy (1994:283), "People interpret historical experience
 through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and world views.... The
 different frames that people apply generally result in variations in learning across
 individuals in the same situation." Thus, there is no reason to expect policy
 convergence even in a world in which international interactions are becoming much
 more frequent. In the evolutionary model, since behavior is emulated, the sheer
 number of contacts increases the number of opportunities for horizontal reproduc-
 tion. In an increasingly interdependent world, policy convergence should increase
 sharply in a wide range of issue areas.16 This is true both because the number of
 opportunities for horizontal reproduction has increased and because the environ-
 ment is becoming more complex and uncertain, reducing the likelihood of effective
 learning and increasing the advantage of relying on emulation.
 A learning model would single out changing understandings of the relative merits
 of the competing alleles. In this view, new norms are adopted due to a complex
 process of reevaluation of basic principles and causal theories. But this focuses only
 on the individual actor, in this case the state, and fails to explain why so many states
 change their policies in the same direction within a very short span of time in the
 absence of any compelling new information likely to motivate such a reevaluation.
 Learning models may provide the equivalent of the genetic mechanism explaining
 change at the individual level, but they do not explain change at the level of the
 population.
 This framework sheds light on why norms so often vary from what would be
 expected from a rational choice perspective, for both good and ill. Behaviors that
 are merely seen as "appropriate" may actually help actors to meet goals in ways of
 which the actors are completely unaware. On the other hand, there can be huge
 lags in behavioral changes as response to structural changes, and norms may become
 maladaptive long before they are altered. The homo behavioralis posited here may
 expend far less cognitive energy than the homo economicus of rational choice theory
 and may find cooperation easier to achieve, but he often finds it difficult to adapt
 well to rapidly changing conditions.
 16 Individual learning or cognitive psychological models may be the equivalent of a genetic mechanism. They are
 necessary to understand the mechanism by which information is transmitted, but they are not essential to the broader
 theory of evolution by emulation and natural selection. Many different transmission mechanisms could be compatible
 with the evolutionary model. One, posited by Farkas, would involve turnover of foreign policy decision makers as the
 mechanism for change.
 Although learning may occur, adaptation is far more common. The mechanism may be turnover of decision makers
 or emulation that is then rationalized in ways that may resemble learning. Either turnover or emulation may explain
 policy convergence, but turnover would require a far more effective selection mechanism than I have considered here:
 one that ruthlessly displaces leaders who fail to adopt adaptive norms and replaces them with leaders who do.
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 Transparency: The Evolution of a New Norm
 The necessity of considering the three factors of initial prominence, coherence, and
 environmental conditions simultaneously to explain norm change shows up clearly
 in the case of a new norm of transparency in military activities and capabilities. For
 more than fifty years, two fundamentally opposed ideas have struggled to shape the
 behavior of states in the security area. The long-dominant norm of the sovereign
 right of states to maintain secrecy about all security matters has gradually ceded
 ground to a new norm of transparency, under which states are obligated to provide
 vast quantities of information to other states. Treaty after treaty now requires states
 to report information about their capabilities and activities and often to host
 inspections by other states, allowing others to acquire information not available
 through national technical means or old-fashioned espionage. This represents a
 change of enormous significance, as secretive behavior that was once taken for
 granted has come to be seen as a signal of nefarious intentions.
 The transparency norm illustrates how the three factors outlined above work in
 the evolution of a norm: (1) It became prominent primarily through the deliberate
 efforts of an entrepreneur, the United States; (2) it fits coherently with other
 relatively recent norms, particularly democratization, multilateralism, and the norm
 against the use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) several developments have
 provided a hospitable environment.
 The Entrepreneur. After the onset of the Cold War, the United States faced a
 geostrategic imperative to gain information on the first adversary in many decades
 able to pose a threat to its homeland. The U.S. attitude toward transparency was
 influenced by the very different domestic structures of the two societies. The United
 States confronted the challenge of discovering the capabilities and intentions of a
 highly secretive adversary that, due to the nature of the respective societies, had
 substantially greater access to information about the United States than the U.S.
 could readily obtain about it. As any state would try to do when faced with a potential
 enemy, the United States set out to gather as much information as possible about
 Soviet behavior, capabilities, and intentions. As is well known, the U.S. spent billions
 of dollars on the development of national technical means of observation. But,
 although these technologies contributed vitally to crisis stability and made unintru-
 sive arms control verification possible, they could not provide sufficient detail about
 capabilities and activities to ensure that the U.S. and its NATO allies would have
 warning of an attempted surprise attack, nor could they provide a guide to
 intentions. Thus, the U.S. consistently and systematically pursued policies aimed at
 inducing other states, particularly the USSR, to provide a wide range of otherwise
 inaccessible information. In other words, the U.S. found itself unable to rely on
 self-help to meet its goal of ensuring adequate warning of surprise attack. Instead,
 it had to attempt to change one of the most deeply rooted norms of state behavior:
 the right to secrecy on military matters.
 To this end, the U.S. put forward a truly novel argument: that the Soviet Union
 was obliged to provide certain types of information about itself to other states, and
 that its only possible motive for failing to do so was that its intentions and activities
 were in fact hostile. From the 1946 Baruch plan for nuclear arms control, with its
 proposed on-site inspection, until the end of the Cold War, the U.S. repeatedly
 proposed intrusive inspections and confidence-building measures that would ren-
 der the USSR nearly as transparent as the U.S. already was, and in some cases would
 greatly increase the military transparency of both countries. Soviet responses to these
 proposals were used in the domestic and international debates by their proponents
 as tests of Soviet intentions. Although these proposals centered on the East-West
 conflict, many were multilateral and some global in scope.
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 So far, this sounds like a standard neorealist explanation, which would argue that
 the emergence of transparency is a temporary phenomenon that simply reflects
 changing interests on the part of a state or group of states powerful enough to make
 most states accept transparency. But it rests on an unfounded empirical assumption:
 that U.S. coercion was responsible for the acceptance of transparency by other
 countries. U.S. power, whether defined as relative military capacity or as share of
 world GNP, was at its peak during the 1950s and 1960s, but U.S. proposals for
 increasing transparency usually fell on deaf ears during this period. Transparency
 blossomed in the 1980s and 1990s, not in the 1950s and 1960s.
 And by that point, U.S. transparency proposals were being put forward largely
 for propaganda purposes, not out of any serious desire to see them implemented.
 This quickly became clear in 1987 when the Soviet Union took the startling step of
 accepting the U.S. proposals for extraordinarily intrusive verification provisions in
 the negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces in Europe. The INF provi-
 sions were so profoundly intrusive that the U.S. found itself forced to backtrack
 substantially on its own proposals to avoid allowing Soviet inspectors to have the
 run of U.S. defense facilities (Garthoff, 1994:327). The Soviet Union could simply
 have called the U.S. bluff on the INF provisions and then retreated to its more
 familiar, secretive positions. Instead, it adopted the old U.S. language almost
 verbatim, challenging the United States to agree to the most intrusive transparency
 provisions yet considered, both in the INF negotiations and then throughout the
 remaining years of superpower negotiations.
 Moreover, U.S. power has played little or no role in many of the more recent
 steps up the transparency ladder. Europe and Japan, for example, led the way on
 the negotiation of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, under which
 since 1992 states have reported annually on their conventional arms imports and
 exports. The United States stayed on the sidelines, expressing skepticism all the
 way. Similarly, in the mid-1980s the United States put forward sweeping demands
 for transparency measures in the chemical weapons negotiations, on which it
 abruptly reneged when it became clear that the proposals might actually be
 accepted. In short, the neorealist premise that powerful states use their material
 advantages to coerce others into behaving as the powerful dictate explains very little
 of the massive shift toward transparency that has occurred in the past few decades.
 That the norm entrepreneur in this case happened to be a powerful state was neither
 a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Nor, as this case makes clear, need the
 entrepreneur's motives be pure.
 The Supporting Normative Structure. There have been three major norm shifts in
 the postwar era, each of which is at least hospitable to transparency: democratiza-
 tion; multilateralism; and restrictions on the use of force, particularly with regard
 to weapons of mass destruction. Democratization, surprisingly enough, has been
 relatively unimportant to the development of transparency, but it is clearly a
 permissive condition, even if it is neither necessary nor sufficient. Democracies are
 by definition more open, less able and less willing to restrict the flow of information.
 Moreover, because they rarely wage war against one another, a world filled with
 democracies is less vulnerable to the security dilemma that so strongly impedes
 increases in voluntary transparency (Doyle, 1986). Certainly there has been an
 extraordinary process of democratization of late, most notably in the former Warsaw
 Pact countries correlating with the explosion in agreements on transparency.
 But states that are relatively open domestically are not necessarily open interna-
 tionally as well. Historically, democracies have not necessarily been more willing to
 make themselves transparent to other states, nor have more authoritarian regimes
 always resisted the sharing of information. In the 1920s, for example, the U.S. was
 strongly opposed to any transparency measures on the grounds that they conflicted
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 with, or might have the potential for someday conflicting with, U.S. sovereignty.
 Conversely, the USSR's acceptance of high levels of voluntary transparency in such
 agreements as the 1986 Stockholm Document and the 1987 INF Treaty predates
 the establishment of anything that could reasonably be called a democracy in the
 Eastern bloc. Even during the height of the Cold War, the democratic European
 members of NATO on occasion proved to be bigger stumbling blocks to transpar-
 ency than their Warsaw Pact counterparts, as in the negotiations over the Non-Pro-
 liferation Treaty.
 Moreover, democratization is a process, not an end state, and most of the states
 referred to as democratizing have a long way to go before they can be considered
 full-fledged stable democracies. In the interim, many of them are having great
 trouble with the concept and implementation of the free flow of information
 (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995). The move to increased voluntary transparency has
 not been caused by democratization, nor will the future of transparency necessarily
 correlate with changes in regime types.
 The other two norms have correlated more directly and importantly. "Multilat-
 eralism" describes a way of coordinating relations among three or more states
 (Ruggie, 1993:11). It is in essence a norm calling for the nondiscriminatory
 application of the agreed principles of conduct, meaning that all the relevant actors
 are expected to play by the same set of rules. In other words, as Anne-Marie Burley
 has pointed out, under multilateralist agreements the rule of law, rather than the
 rule of power, guides state actions (1993:144). Nor are relations between states
 differentiated according to the particulars of the situation at hand. This nondis-
 crimination is enforced by diffuse rather than specific reciprocity: that is, by the
 expectation that compliance now will generate long-term compliance by others,
 rather than by a specific tit-for-tat policy by each state with regard to every other.
 The essence of multilateralism as a norm of international relations is the "belief that
 activities ought to be organized on a universal basis at least for a 'relevant' group"
 (Caporaso, 1993:55). This nondiscriminatory multilateralism "now carr[ies] with it
 an international legitimacy not enjoyed by other means" of diplomacy (Ruggie,
 1993:23).
 Multilateralism is not new in the postwar era, but it has become markedly more
 prevalent. It now applies in a wide range of issue areas, most notably in trade under
 GATT and the application of most-favored-nation status, but it is becoming preva-
 lent in security issues as well. Most notably, the United States instituted multilater-
 alist norms in the creation and development of NATO (Weber, 1993).
 The norm of transparency may have had its start in the atmosphere of specific
 reciprocity in the context of bilateral superpower agreements, but it has benefited
 enormously from, and often depended upon, the legitimation inherent in a multi-
 lateral nondiscriminatory process. Only when the U.S. agreed to open its civilian
 nuclear plants to IAEA inspection, thus applying the transparency norm to itself,
 was agreement possible on the inspection provisions of the Non-Proliferation
 Treaty. Since then, security accords have overwhelmingly relied on nondiscrimina-
 tory application of the rules to the parties. The Chemical Weapons Convention, for
 examle, unlike the NPT, makes no allowances for states that already possess
 chemical weapons. All parties are subject to the same bans and limitations of their
 chemical facilities, and all are subject on the same terms to the convention's
 extremely intrusive inspection procedures. And there are no provisions for tit-
 for-tat specific reciprocity in the more recent security agreements. Instead, they
 depend upon the diffuse reciprocity and concern for reputation characteristic of
 multilateralism.
 One effect of technological developments of the past century has been to create
 distinctions among categories ofweapons. The use of so-called "conventional" weapons
 is accepted, no matter how devastating their effects. The use and increasingly even the
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 possession of "weapons of mass destruction"-that is, nuclear, chemical, and bio-
 logical weapons-is not. The political and moral constraints surrounding the latter
 go much beyond rational deterrence. That is, states refrain from using them even
 when there is no reason to fear retaliation in kind. The U.S. did not use gas against
 Japan even in the later stages of World War II, "even though there was no threat of
 retaliation and [chemical weapons] would have been enormously effective against
 Japanese forces entrenched in the tunnels and caves of the Pacific Islands" (Price
 and Tannenwald, 1994:6). Similarly, the United States refrained from using nuclear
 weapons despite its monopoly in the early postwar years, nor did any of the nuclear
 weapons states use them in the many military actions they have undertaken
 since-even the ones they have lost against non-nuclear powers. These taboos are
 clearly normative, not purely "rational" calculations of costs and benefits. As
 Thomas Schelling has noted, much of the uniqueness of nuclear weapons "derives
 from their being perceived as unique.... It is simply an established convention that
 nuclear weapons are different" (Schelling, 1994: 1).
 This norm of nonuse is gradually broadening itself to include a prohibition on
 possession by most if not all countries. This is clearly the case with regard to chemical
 weapons, over which a convention has been negotiated that will seriously constrain
 any attempts by its parties to maintain or obtain a chemical weapons arsenal. A ban
 on possession is necessarily deeply intertwined with the norm of transparency. It is
 only because transparency became so broadly accepted that agreement on the
 Chemical Weapons Convention became possible. Chemical weapons are easily
 manufactured from precursor chemicals that are widely used throughout the world
 economy. Restricting production of these precursors is technologically and eco-
 nomically unfeasible, but monitoring their production is possible-as long as
 governments are willing to impose highly intrusive inspection procedures on their
 chemical industry. These inspections will be carried out by an international agency.
 Moreover, parties must allow substantial numbers of short-notice "challenge"
 inspections. Only because the norm of transparency had already become prevalent
 in the population of states was it possible to secure broad agreement on these terms
 for the CWC. In turn, the CWC further institutionalizes the norm of transparency,
 setting precedents for future multilateral arms control accords.
 Transparency is also intertwined with aweaker but growing norm thatwould limit
 "excessive and destabilizing" concentrations of conventional weapons. Spurred by
 the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath, the U.N. General Assembly in
 December 1991 created a Register of Conventional Arms aimed at introducing
 greater transparency into the conventional arms trade and arms holdings. The
 Register provides a means for states to list their imports and exports in seven
 categories of weapons considered particularly useful for surprise attack or major
 offenses. In its first two years of operation, the Register has been surprisingly
 successful, with most major importers and exporters providing what appears to be
 reasonably complete, if sketchy, reports. Although in part the Register simply
 provides a centralized location for what was in any case a trend toward releasing
 more information on the arms trade, in at least some cases states have changed
 well-entrenched domestic legislation mandating secrecy in such matters to allow
 them to participate in the Register (Laurance and Wulf, 1994:46). Rather than
 attempting to control the conventional arms trade, the Register reflects the trans-
 parency norm: while no attempt to ban trade in (or production of) such items as
 tanks and conventional missiles is in prospect, states ought at least to provide
 information on their military capabilities that could pose a threat to others.
 Environment. Two types of external conditions have provided a hospitable envi-
 ronment for the spread of the transparency norm: political shocks and technological
 developments. When Iraq's near-success in developing an arsenal of weapons of
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 mass destruction was revealed after the Gulf War, states seized on the precedent of
 Great-Power transparency. This led to the successful conclusion of the negotiation
 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, with its extraordinarily intrusive verification
 provisions, and the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms Trans-
 fers, under which most arms importers and exporters voluntarily list their arms
 trade every year.
 Technology has also played a key role. Indeed, some would argue that national
 technical means, or more broadly the information revolution, have made it impos-
 sible for states to keep secrets from each other. In this view, the acceptance of
 intrusive verification measures represent nothing more than codification of the
 reality that others are capable of observing states regardless of whether those states
 want to be observed. For most countries, who do not have any ability to attack or
 interfere with spy satellites, "allowing" their territory to be observed by satellite
 reconnaissance does not constitute voluntary transparency. Given what has been
 publicly revealed about the capabilities of U.S. satellites, all major and middle
 powers are probably aware that satellites are providing the U.S. (and presumably
 Russia) with substantial information on matters ranging from civil disturbances to
 economic developments and nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.
 Although superficially plausible, this view is demonstrably wrong. As is clear from
 the surprise over the extent of Iraq's nuclear program and the uncertainty about
 whether North Korea yet has a nuclear weapon, it is quite possible for states to keep
 hidden very significant information about their military capabilities and activities if
 they choose to do so. National technical means have important limitations. Even
 the United States, with by far the heaviest investment in national technical means
 of verification of any state, has no more than half a dozen spy satellites in orbit at
 any given time, each of which is limited in its ability to observe at night or through
 clouds or in its resolution. Large parts of the planet go unobserved each day, and
 vast quantities of data that do come in are never analyzed.
 These external shocks-the advent of nuclear weapons, the information revolu-
 tion, and the Gulf War-undoubtedly spurred the evolution of the norm of trans-
 parency in crucial ways. But that is far from the whole story. Until quite recently,
 most major powers vigorously contested this "rational" solution to the advent of
 nuclear weapons. The norm remains contested in many parts of the world and by
 many countries that both possess and are threatened by nuclear weapons, such as
 China, India, and Pakistan. Although voluntary transparency may be a "rational"
 response to life in a dangerous world, it is not the only "rational" response available
 to states.
 Each of the three factors is a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain the
 evolution of the norm. The initial U.S. promotion of the norm was essential, but on
 its own it was unsuccessful. The U.S. position was effectively resisted by most other
 countries for many decades even when U.S. power was at its peak. Cooperating
 norms such as democratization and nonuse of weapons of mass destruction were
 likewise relevant, but neither democracy nor abhorrence of particularly destructive
 weapons had in the past led to a norm of transparency. Environment conditions
 such as power relationships and changing technology, although essential, do not by
 themselves account for the evolution of the norm of transparency.
 Although evolutionary theory, with its emphasis on the role of contingency, is
 inherently nonpredictive, attention to the factors described above provides insight
 into the trends that bear watching. Since the norm is already prominent, the U.S.
 role in promoting it should no longer be necessary. Indeed, as the debate over the
 Chemical Weapons Convention shows, the U.S. has found that transparency now
 often goes further than the U.S. would prefer. Interaction with other norms is likely
 to remain positive. For example, the norm opposing the use of weapons of mass
 destruction appears well entrenched. In addition, few governments are able to resist
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 the demands of their populations for greater levels of accountability and democracy.
 Environmental conditions may cut both ways. The information revolution will
 reduce the costs of gathering and transmitting information even further, but other
 technologies may make it easier to hide military capabilities and activities.
 The true wild card in evolution is the emergence of new mutations, and there
 may be a new norm on the scene that would directly challenge the norm of
 transparency. To date, transparency in the security field has not encompassed
 economically significant information. As the degree of transparency called for
 grows, the information involved will increasingly have economic value, as illustrated
 by the transparency requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
 economic value of proprietary commercial information, rather than the military
 value of security information, may be the chief allele in the future competition with
 the norm of transparency.
 Other Examples of Norm Evolution
 Although the constructivist literature universally avoids explicit theorizing about
 why one norm rather than another comes to dominate, virtually every empirical
 study of the spread of a given norm focuses on the two variables of entrepreneurship
 and coherence, in addition to the environmental conditions already familiar from
 standard international relations theory. For example, the growing literature on the
 emergence of norms constraining the possession and use of weapons of mass
 destruction points both to the "self-conscious efforts on the part of some to foster a
 normative stigma," as one study put it, and to the logical connection with previously
 established norms of the illegitimacy of using "disproportionate" force or attacking
 noncombatants (Price and Tannenwald, 1994). Another study evaluating the new
 norm that allows and sometimes insists on military intervention for humanitarian
 purposes, even when no geopolitical "interests" are at stake, also concentrates on
 the importance of the larger normative environment, particularly multilateralism.
 This study argues that "mutually reinforcing and logically consistent norms appear
 to be harder to attack and to have an advantage in normative contestation that goes
 on in social life" (Finnemore, 1994). In Goldstein's innovative article on the role of
 ideas in U.S. trade policies, she argues that in times of crisis, new ideas are
 demanded. Two things will determine which new idea is ultimately accepted: which
 ones are supplied; and of these which "fit" well with existing structures (Goldstein,
 1989:32). She does not expand theoretically on these claims.
 Nadelmann's review of a whole host of norms that prohibit once-acceptable
 behavior provides a particularly useful comparison of two cases in which the same
 norm entrepreneur at the same time tried to promote two related norms, one of
 which succeeded and one of which failed, the only difference between the two cases
 being the presence or absence of an agreed larger normative framework. The U.S.
 role in delegitimizing the recreational use of drugs on a global scale is relatively well
 known and well documented. Opium and cocaine, for example, were widely legal
 and available a century ago, but they are not legal anywhere now. What is less well
 known is that for decades the United States took very similar steps to try to create
 an anti-alcohol norm, but failed miserably, even though the economic and social
 costs of alcohol abuse in most societies are demonstrably far greater than the costs
 of abuse of other drugs (Nadelmann, 1990).
 One of the most ambitious efforts to address the role of ideas in international
 relations, the edited volume by Goldstein and Keohane, contains several contribu-
 tions that indicate the importance of both norm entrepreneurship and the broader
 normative climate. In his discussion of the institutionalization of Keynesian ideas in
 the postwar economic order, for example, Ikenberry stresses two causal factors, "the
 political standing of the ideas' advocates (i.e., the strength of the individual norm
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 entrepreneurs), and a more diffuse shift in the norm web about the appropriate
 socioeconomic role of government" (1993). Similarly, in her discussion about the
 evolution of human rights norms, Sikkink stresses the role of entrepreneurs in the
 form of nongovernmental organizations forcing government to accept language in
 international agreements, along with broader changes in widely held beliefs about
 the scope of the authority governments should be allowed to exercise over their
 citizens (Sikkink, 1993).
 Conclusion
 Prevailing theoretical approaches to understanding changes in state behavior are
 based on an implicitly evolutionary framework that is seriously out of date. Neore-
 alism draws its view of the system from a time when war was the primary agent of
 selection, and selection occurred at the level of the organism-that is, the state.
 Neorealism assumes that states are obsessed by relative power and made inherently
 and irremediably insecure by anarchy. But this is not a permanent condition. It is
 merely a once-dominant phenotype of an evolving population. Under current
 circumstances, war no longer shapes the behavior of major states to anything like
 the degree it once did, and new considerations are shaping state behavior. Interna-
 tional change even in the security field is becoming far more a question of competing
 ideas, not competing military organizations.
 Population genetics provides a valuable framework for considering the question
 of interest to this study: given that there are competing norms, what determines
 whether one will win out over the other or if both will be maintained in the
 population. Population genetics asks the same types of questions: in the end, will
 only one of a set of competing alleles survive (i.e., will the population become fixed
 for that allele), or will the population be polymorphic? The analogy is useful because
 of the extensive parallels between the two types of evolution. Both norms and genes
 are units of instruction. Both are transmitted from one individual to another
 through a system of inheritance. Both are contested, that is, there are variants of
 traits competing to be reproduced. Both are subject to selection forces that deter-
 mine which of the competitors will come to dominate. And both require three
 simultaneously favorable conditions for the spread of new mutants: initial promi-
 nence, coherence with other genes/norms present in the same organism, and
 advantageous environmental conditions.
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